Genetic information is relevant not only to the patient, but also to their family. Where a patient refuses to share that information with family members, then their legal rights may conflict. This paper focuses on that conflict between the rights of individuals and the rights of third parties. We first examine the nature of the duty of confidence as it applies in these circumstances, and the extent to which it can appropriately accommodate the familial nature of genetic information. We then consider the situations in which a health care practitioner might owe a third party family member a tortious duty of care. We conclude that in most cases, there will be no duty owed to third parties, but that in certain limited circumstances, a duty of care should arise.
Introduction
Medical confidentiality in the context of genetics raises interesting tensions because the information in question is not only relevant to an individual patient, but also to family members. The information is more relevant to relatives closer in degree, and the chance of it being relevant reduces the further away in the family tree the relative is from the original patient. It is possible that the interests of the patient and the family member may conflict -such as where a patient does not wish to share genetic information with a family member, but where that information might allow that family member to obtain a diagnosis and take action to avoid a negative outcome. Such a situation raises important and interesting legal questions, which have been reinvigorated by recent case law. 1 In ABC v St George's, 2 the claimant argued that a healthcare practitioner ('HCP') who had failed to disclose genetic information to a family member was liable to that family member in negligence. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from the High Court, which had struck out the claim as having no reasonable cause of action at a preliminary hearing before trial. 3 The claim may now be tried, and it will be for the lower court to determine if a HCP has a legal duty to disclose genetic information to any family member of their patient. It is our contention that a blunt exclusion of any duty in all circumstances pushes the balance of rights too far in the direction of the maintenance 3 of confidentiality. As a result of this approach, a HCP would be well advised to maintain confidentiality in all circumstances, notwithstanding ethical arguments in favour of disclosure, as they will never be liable for failure to disclose to a third party, but could be liable for breach of confidence. This in our view is problematic
In this paper we focus on the conflicts between the rights of individuals and the rights of third parties. 4 We first examine the nature of the duty of confidence as it applies in these circumstances, and the extent to which it can appropriately accommodate the familial nature of genetic information. We then consider the situations in which a HCP might owe a third party family member a tortious duty of care. We conclude that in most cases, there will be no duty owed to third parties, but that in certain limited circumstances, a duty of care should arise. We argue that controls on liability can better be imposed by consideration of breach, rather than by imposing a blanket exclusion of all duties of care.
This is a paper focused primarily on the law of confidence and duty of care to third parties in genetics, more than ethical and professional obligations. Although the bioethics literature informs the law in important respects, and is relevant to our analysis, our discussions are mainly focused on the legal position, rather than the moral or ethical argumentation. Moreover, we integrate an exploration of the duty of confidence and the 4 We limit our consideration in this paper to the rights and duties arising in the clinical context, and therefore do not consider the duties which might arise where a participant takes part in research, or where non-clinical genetic testing is undertaken (such as direct-to-consumer testing for interest or ancestry testing). It is worth noting however that the clear distinctions which may in the past have been possible between research and clinical testing may be increasingly blurred, especially in the field of 'precision medicine'. These questions are discussed in C Mitchell et al, ' Exploring the potential duty of care in clinical genomics under UK law' (2017) Medical Law International (in press). 8 Single gene disorder range from relatively common genetic disorders such as CF with an incidence of about 1 in 2400 live births in the UK population: JA Dodge and others, 'Cystic Fibrosis Mortality and Survival in the UK: 1947-2003' (2007) 29 Eur Respiratory J 522, to extremely rare disorders which might have an incidence of perhaps 1 or even fewer in all births in a year in the UK if an individual possesses at least one affected copy of the relevant gene, with a 50 percent risk that offspring will inherit the mutation from the affected parent. Many autosomal dominant disorders either have a delayed age of onset or exhibit reduced penetrance, that is, there is not a 100 percent chance that the person will exhibit symptoms of the disease in question. 9 An autosomal recessive disorder is a disorder which requires two affected copies of the gene to manifest clinically. When an individual concerned possesses only one of two affected copies of the gene, they are a carrier, and they do not manifest the disease, or will have very mild symptoms in comparison with the disease state. 10 An X-linked disorder is one which is inherited via the X chromosome, and may be either dominant or recessive. An X-linked dominant disorder manifests very severely in males, and often leads to spontaneous loss of an affected pregnancy or neonatal death; females have less severe features than males. An X-linked recessive disorder is encoded on the X chromosome such that a female who possesses one normal copy and one affected copy of the gene will not manifest the disease (although may have some minor features of the condition), but a male, 11 if he inherits the affected copy of the gene, will manifest the disease.
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This classification of diseases is something of an oversimplification. Not all disease genes are fully penetrant, and there may be variable severity in how a disease manifests in different individuals who all carry the same mutation, even within families. Moreover, later onset diseases may have an earlier or later age of onset, and there are myriad genetic and environmental factors which influence disease course. Genetic inheritance is complex, and research continues in an attempt to further elucidate disease inheritance mechanisms.
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As may be evident from this short recital of genetic disease mechanisms, while the genetic information of an individual diagnosed with a genetic disease (the proband) may also be relevant to members of his or her family, the extent to which that information is relevant will vary depending on factors such as the closeness of the 
Recent case law
Two recent cases have provided the first English cases which are relevant to the question of confidentiality and the duty to warn in the context of genetic testing. In both, the claim was brought by a relative of the proband who had suffered damage as a 14 We acknowledge that cases of passive non-disclosure exist, where a patient undertakes to disclose to family members, and then does not. There are many and varied reasons and patterns of this non-disclosure. (For an examination of the complexities of this area see Arribas-Ayllon, M., Featherstone, K. & Atkinson, P. "The practical ethics of genetic responsibility: Nondisclosure and the autonomy of affect" (2011) 9 Soc Theory Health 3) However, for the purposes of this paper, we focus on the situation where a HCP is aware of a patient's intention not to disclose, in order to clearly examine the relevant legal principles. It may be worth noting however that a HCP who acts reasonably and who is unaware of a failure to disclose is unlikely to be liable in tort, and is similarly unlikely to choose to seek to disclose to a third party in spite of the duty of confidence. that the elements of proximity and foreseeability had been made out, he considered the nine reasons that the defendant had set out that it would not be 'fair, just and reasonable'
to impose a duty to disclose confidential genetic information.
The reasons included that the interest of the third party in receiving the information was a private interest that could not prevail over the public interest in maintaining 21 The court was prepared to accept, for the purposes of the application, that such a claim could have succeeded, had the defendant owed a duty of case. However, the claimant would have faced significant barriers, including establishing that the defendant's breach had caused actionable harm: see Victoria Chico 'Non-disclosure of genetic risks: The case for developing legal wrongs' (2016) 16(1-2) Medical Law International 3-26. 22 At [31] . 23 At [27] . 24 At [102] : "The development of the law of negligence has been by an incremental process rather than giant steps." (Lord Toulson, with whom Lords Neuberger, Mance, Reed and Hodge agreed). confidentiality; that it would encourage HCPs to disclose when not justified; that the HCP would be subject to conflicting duties of confidentiality to the patient and disclosure to the third party; that it would undermine trust in HCPs and discourage patients from disclosing information; that it would cause HCPs to put undue pressure on patients to consent to disclosure; that it might be damaging to the third party's mental health to receive the information; and that it would place an additional burden on HCPs which would distract them from their role in treating patients.
The court noted that an HCP in possession of genetic information which affected a third party would, in some circumstances, be under an existing professional, as opposed to legal, obligation to disclose. The conflict between the duty of confidence to the patient and a professional obligation to prevent harm to others already existed and it was not established that to make the professional obligation legally binding would cause the problems claimed. Accordingly, none of the policy considerations was sufficiently powerful to justify allowing the claim to be struck out before trial. 28 34 In this case, there was a failure to diagnose adrenomyeloneuropathy, a genetic disorder: the HCP ordered diagnostic tests but they were not carried out. As a result, the patient was not diagnosed until one of the claimants (his second cousin) was himself diagnosed with the childhood variant of the condition, adrenoleukodystrophy.
The claim was against the HCP who failed to diagnose the condition at the earliest opportunity: had the earlier diagnosis been made, the claimants could have been tested at an earlier stage and taken steps to ameliorate their condition. As in ABC, the strike out application was granted: the court held that it would not be 'fair, just and reasonable'
to impose a duty on a HCP in relation to a third party who was not a patient. 33 Safer (n 31) 1192. 34 [2016] EWHC 817 (QB).
In this case, the reason that the relative was not informed was that the HCP had failed to diagnose the patient, rather than that the HCP was respecting the patient's refusal to consent to disclosure of his genetic information.
Competing duties?
The nature of the English adversarial system is that cases tend to focus on either the question of the duty of confidence or the duty to warn. However, in the case of disclosure of genetic information to relatives against the wishes of the proband, the two duties are directly competing. We therefore examine the law relating to the duty of confidence, before considering the potential scope of the tortious duty to warn.
Duty of confidence
That a duty of confidence exists in relation to medical information is axiomatic. The traditional formulation of an equitable duty of confidence, with its three elements is:
the information is of a private, personal or intimate nature; it is imparted in circumstances imposing an obligation of confidence; and it has been disclosed without authorisation. In the context of disclosure of genetic information, consent is undoubtedly the most practical legitimation of disclosure and those working in clinical genetics work hard to gain consent to disclosure. 42 This may be facilitated through explanations and counselling prior to testing of the proband, and the use of follow up counselling.
Clinical genetics professionals may also attempt to circumvent strained family relationships through offers to convene meetings, provision of appropriate letters for the proband to distribute to family or offers to communicate with other HCPs (including GPs) where this might help facilitate disclosure. 43 Despite the complications in practice, as a matter of law however, the question of consent is largely uncontroversial -consent will either be present or absent, and will be a question of fact in a particular case.
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Aplin and others, Gurry on Breach of Confidence (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2012). [6.122] In contrast however, the question of disclosure in the public interest is more complex.
The equitable duty of confidence is traditionally seen as a balancing of two competing public interests -the public interest in the maintenance of confidence on the one hand, and the public interest in disclosure on the other. 45 Similarly, an Art 8 analysis requires the balancing of competing interests to determine whether disclosure is in the public interest. 46 The cases on disclosure in the public interest in medical law can be characterised as falling into three broad categories: prevention of harm to others, prevention or detection of crime, and teaching, research or audit. 47 It is only the first of these categories which will be of relevance to a HCP wishing to disclose genetic information to a third party member of the family of the proband.
The paradigm English case about disclosure in the public interest is W v Egdell. 48 The plaintiff, who was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, shot and killed five people and injured two others in 1974. His plea of guilty to a charge of manslaughter was accepted, and he was detained in a psychiatric hospital. In support of his application for a transfer to a regional secure unit some twelve years later, the plaintiff sought a report from the defendant as an independent consultant psychiatrist. The defendant's report did not support the plaintiff's application; it disclosed that the plaintiff had a long standing and continuing interest in homemade bombs, and did not accept the view that the plaintiff was no longer a danger to the public. to the tribunal and refused to consent to the defendant disclosing the report to the medical officer at the secure hospital. However, the defendant disclosed the report without consent to the medical officer of the psychiatric hospital. On discovering the disclosure, the plaintiff sued for breach of confidence. It was held that whilst a duty of confidence was owed, and that maintenance of the duty of confidence was a matter of public interest, the public interest in maintaining the confidence (so that patients can trust their HCPs) must be balanced against the public interest in favour of disclosure (to the protect the public). Disclosure was justified in this case. The court held that what was required to justify disclosure in the public interest was a real, and not merely theoretical, risk of imminent and serious harm.
Other cases on disclosure in the public interest are few. Virtually all other cases have been about the disclosure of private information in the press, and the focus has rather been on the balancing of the public interest in the maintenance of confidentiality or privacy against public interest in disclosure pursuant to the Art 10 right to freedom of expression. 49 In Stone 50 , the court considered the application of Art 8 to the question of whether it was in the public interest to disclose the private medical information about a convicted murderer in the context of a report into the failures of the system of psychiatric and social care. The court held that the balance was in favour of disclosure, and was particularly influenced by the fact that the publicity and need for the report the Art 8 rights of individuals against the public interest draw more heavily on the public interest aspects of the Art 10 right to freedom of speech. 51 Such Art 10 rights are unlikely to be engaged in the question of disclosure of genetic information to family members of the proband, so the case law provides little assistance.
Balancing -relevant considerations
The application of the law in this field to the disclosure of genetic information is complex. Egdell was a case where the requirements were all clearly satisfied on their facts -there was a real risk of serious physical harm, with a clear degree of imminence.
Difficulties arise in the way in which the test can be applied in the genetic context however, in all three aspects of risk, imminence and seriousness. Each of these considerations will need to be viewed in a more nuanced manner than in the typical scenarios in cases such as Egdell, where there was an imminent risk of serious criminal harm from a psychiatric patient.
The courts have traditionally viewed the duty of confidence as important and have been slow to find a public interest in disclosure in the absence of serious physical harm, or an Art 10 interest. It therefore seems plausible that for a disease which has an adult onset, with variable penetrance (such as for example BRCA breast cancer) that the traditional requirements would not be satisfied. This may sit uneasily with many clinicians, and potentially with the General Medical Council guidance on the duty of confidence. In light of Art 8 considerations, a more flexible view can and should be taken. In Stone, the court spoke of the need to examine the facts and circumstances of each case, and to adopt a "close and penetrating examination". 53 Accordingly, a balance must be struck between the Art 8 rights of the proband, as against the Art 8 rights of the family members.
Risk
The court in Egdell spoke of a real, rather than merely theoretical, risk. In that case, the risk was seen to be real, although the person likely to manifest the risk was still in a secure unit, and unlikely to be released into the community for some time, and only after satisfying a number of other conditions set by various tribunals. 
Imminence
In Egdell, the court attached some significance to the imminence of the harm in question -the potential release from a secure hospital, and ultimately into the community.
Genetic diseases are rarely imminent, in the sense that harm will arise within hours or days. Many genetic diseases may be late onset, and the harm may arise many years into the future. However, medical interventions or screening may be possible at an early stage, and lifestyle changes can begin very early. In this sense, whilst the ultimate serious harm may not be immediate, some efforts to avert that harm may be imminently possible.
Serious harm
The question of whether harm is serious in the genetic context is also complex. Some cases may be clear, for example where the consequences of the disease are serious and there is an intervention possible. An instructive example is the case of a sudden cardiac death mutation where a defibrillator may be implanted, and/or medication may prevent sudden death, or the option exists to have increased screening or monitoring for early symptoms of the conditions (e.g. in Lynch syndrome which predisposes to various cancers). However, other genetic diseases, such as Huntington's disease are serious but have no (yet) known interventions. However, genetic medicine advances rapidly, and new treatments arise. To avoid disclosure now on the basis that there is no currently known treatment makes a decision frozen in time. Unless there is a means to regularly revisit decisions made on this basis, then there is a chance that someone is deprived of a chance to obtain treatment in the future, on the basis that their risk of inheriting the condition is not made known to them.
Even where there is no means to prevent a serious outcome such as death, there may be other steps which an individual might wish to take if they know about their risk. The opportunity to make reproductive choices is an obvious matter -including undertaking invasive testing of a pregnancy or seeking preimplantation genetic diagnosis to avoid passing on a familial condition. Other options include changing life choices, such as avoiding particular careers or doing things at a younger age to avoid missing out on opportunities if predisposed to a late onset condition.
In addition, harm could be constituted by the failure to know about carrier status, and thus passing on a genetic condition to a child. Would the balance be in favour of disclosure to relatives who could only be carriers, rather than having the condition themselves? Those individuals will not have serious health consequences themselves, but they would be able to use the information to make informed reproductive choices.
Arguably, the flexibilities inherent in the human rights (or indeed equitable) approach enable the court to take a more expansive view of harm. Accordingly, these types of harm which might be more problematic for a tort claim could be sufficient to justify disclosure in the public interest.
Balancing of competing rights:
The balance in the case of disclosure to family members, in contrast to most of the cases in this field, is not between competing Art 8 and Art 10 rights, but rather competing Art Since publication, the joint account model has been widely cited, and has been broadly adopted in bioethics literature. 57 It has informed the guidelines from the Joint Committee on Medical Genetics about consent and confidentiality to the extent that the guidelines recommend a record of discussion form for genetic testing which includes a statement that "I acknowledge that my results will sometimes be used to inform the appropriate healthcare of family members" rather than asking for agreement to sharing. What seems less workable is a broad adoption of the ethical joint account model as a legal model which sees the information in question as 'belonging' to all family members jointly. First, it is not clear who the information would be 'owned' by. As noted above, information has diminishing relevance to family members the further away from the proband they are in relatedness. However, there is still a chance that the information is relevant. As Liao notes, different types of genetic information will have stronger reasons to be shared with some family members than others, due to the nature of disease inheritance. 62 It seems unlikely that a broad conception of joint 'ownership' of genetic information would be in accordance with Art 8 obligations. Finally, treating genetic information in this exceptional manner seems unwarranted, as other health information (such as cholesterol levels) is private to the individual, whilst nonetheless having some relevance for family members. 63 Interestingly, in research carried out into patient views on the sharing of genetic information with family members without consent, the patient views arguably aligned more with the law of confidence than the joint account model. 64 Dheensa and colleagues found that the patients they studied found it generally acceptable that a HCP share information with family members without consent and that while they considered that this would indeed be a breach of confidence, that the 'harm was trivial compared with the benefit of knowing about the risk'. In our view, this approach broadly accords with the authorisation of disclosure of confidential information in the public interest, with the justification framed in terms of preventing illness that could lead to avoidable harm. 63 Although some HCPs would argue that information about cholesterol levels, at least when high enough to suggest a familial component, is information which should also be shared with family members, akin to genetic information. Where there is no refusal to communicate, then both the legal approach and the joint account model are consistent -whether there is consent to disclosure and therefore no breach in the traditional model, or the information is part of the joint account -HCP, proband and third party will be satisfied as to their legal rights and responsibilities. The difficulties (as in all areas of law) arise at the margins, where conflict arises. In the type of case which concerns us in this paper, where the proband refuses either to consent to disclosure or to pass on the relevant information to third parties, the law and the joint account model seem likely to result in different outcomes.
The duty to family members
The duty of confidentiality is a duty owed to the proband. Those family members who may share genes with the proband are third parties: external to the confidential relationship. It is, as considered above, permissible in some circumstances to disclose information to third parties. However, no duty to a third party can arise under a duty of confidentiality.
In the absence of a confidential or contractual relationship between the HCP and the third party, a legal duty to disclose can only arise in tort: specifically, in negligence. A claim in negligence requires that the HCP owes a duty of care to the third party: without such a duty, the negligence claim fails at the first hurdle. and causing economic loss. 73 Our analysis of these cases concludes that both precedent and legal principle both support the imposition of a limited duty of care on HCPs, where they are aware of information that would seriously affect a third party. The duty would be to take reasonable steps to ensure that third parties who bear sufficient proximity to the patient and who will foreseeably be seriously affected are aware of the information.
We also consider whether, in the context of healthcare, it is necessary to use duty of care as a 'control mechanism', to keep the tort of negligence within acceptable bounds.
We conclude that such a control mechanism is not justified in this context.
The duty to warn
A duty to warn is a duty to inform a claimant of information, which the defendant knew or should have known, which would have allowed the claimant to avoid harm. As far as English courts are concerned, a failure to warn is a 'pure omission' 74 -Actual knowledge;
-Conscious decision to accept responsibility for primary 91 party;
-Tight causal connection.
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Applying these principles, a duty of care to a third party will arise where a professional undertakes a duty to a primary party; that the defendant knows that breach will cause damage to a third party of the same type as the defendant is under a duty to prevent to the primary party; and there is no conflict between the interests of the primary and third parties. 93 This, coupled with causal proximity, creates a duty of care.
The relationship in White, between a professional and the third parties who are both proximate to his client and liable to suffer damage through the professional's acts or omissions, applies directly to the relationship between the healthcare professional and those who are proximate to the patient. governing body of boxing owed duty of care to boxers, they went on to state a wider principle:
These cases 95 establish that, where A advises B as to action to be taken which will directly and foreseeably affect the safety or well-being of C, a situation of sufficient proximity exists to found a duty of care on the part of A towards C.
96
With this exception, the extended Hedley Byrne principle has been mainly applied to situations involving economic loss. However, that is a consequence of the principle being applied in circumstances where the duty to the primary party is to avoid economic loss, rather than physical injury. There is no reason that a duty for a HCP not to cause injury, by failing to warn, should not be founded on the same principle. Indeed, as a general principle, courts should be more ready to find a duty of care where the damage caused is physical rather than economic. 97 [1996] 1 AC 211. A marine surveyor negligently allowed a ship, which later sank, to retain its classification. The House of Lords held that it would not be 'fair, just and reasonable' to hold the defendant liable to the cargo owners. question. However, when it was argued that the Court of Appeal should apply the same approach to physical injury as to economic loss, Hobhouse LJ held:
What the Second and Third Defendants seek to achieve in this case is to extend decisions upon "economic" loss to cases of personal injuries. It represents a fundamental attack upon the principle of tortious liability for negligent conduct which had caused foreseeable personal injury to others. That such a point should be considered to be even arguable shows how far some of the fundamental principles of the law of negligence have come to be eroded. to generate a duty of care. In the case of economic loss, something more is needed.
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Applying these principles to the doctor-patient relationship, it is clear that, in some circumstances, a HCP should owe a duty of care to third parties. contagious disease, such as meningitis, and allows her to return home. 103 The ill child then infects a sibling before dying of the condition. The sibling suffers permanent brain damage. In these circumstances, there is no doubt that the paediatrician does owe a duty of care to the child's mother and father. 104 If the shock of seeing her child die causes the mother to suffer a psychiatric illness, the paediatrician would be liable in negligence. It would clearly be 'fair, just and reasonable' for the paediatrician also to be liable to the sibling who contracted the disease and suffered personal injury.
Third party claims against HCPs are rare. In the case of West Bromwich Albion FC v El-Safty, 105 an orthopaedic surgeon had advised reconstructive surgery on a players' knee. The surgery was unsuccessful and the player was not able to play football: as a result, the football club lost his services while remaining liable for his wages. A claim by the footballer in negligence succeeded, with the surgeon admitting negligence.
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However, the claim by the football club failed: the Court of Appeal held that the surgeon did not owe a duty not to cause financial loss to the footballer's employers.
As Rix LJ pointed out, unlike Gorham, there was no 'fundamental community' between the patient's interests and his employer's interests: the employee's interest was financial, while the patient's interest was medical. The 'fundamental community' requirement seems to be that the damage to the third party is either the same or of the same type as the defendant was under a duty not to cause to the primary party. In successful third party claims, 107 the third party's interests coincided with the primary party's.
In general, third parties cannot recover for economic loss caused by physical injury caused to the primary party: 108 however, if there is a duty not to cause physical injury, as exists in the doctor-patient relationship, the fundamental community requirement will be met and the third party should be able to recover for physical injury.
Duty as a Control Mechanism
Duty of care is the preferred 'control mechanism' in negligence: by restricting the expansion of new duties of care, the courts have sought to control the proliferation of claims 109 and to relieve defendants from indeterminate liability. As noted by Lord
Nicholls in D v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust:
110 Abandonment of the concept of a duty of care in English law, unless replaced by a control mechanism which recognises this limitation, is unlikely to clarify the law. That control mechanism has yet to be identified.
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One of the principal areas in which duty of care has been used as a control mechanism has been when determining the liability of public authorities for 'pure omissions', such as failure to prevent physical injury caused by a third party or external causes. The courts have consistently held that there is no duty of care in those circumstances.
Decided cases have included a failure of the police to arrest a serial murderer 112 or persons who had threatened the claimant, 113 failure of a local authority to warn a resident that his neighbour was likely to cause him harm, 114 failure of a health authority to recognise that a patient under the care of a mental health team posed a danger to the public, 115 and failure of the police to respond to a 999 call.
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This restrictive approach is largely based on public policy arguments. 117 In addition,
where the claimant is a member of the general public, there will be no proximity between defendant and claimant: in the By placing the control mechanism at the breach, rather than at the duty stage, courts have been able to maintain a balance: protecting HCPs from indeterminate liability and not encouraging defensive medicine while at the same time recognising that "the rule of public policy which has first claim on the loyalty of the law" is that wrongs should be remedied.
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The duty of care in the medical context
In the medical context, the reasons to hold that there is no duty to a third party fall away:
the public policy reasons do not apply with such force; and duty of care is not needed as a control mechanism. As a result, the arguments against finding that a HCP might owe a third party -such as a first order relative of the proband -a duty of care become correspondingly weaker.
In the case of psychiatric injury caused by witnessing a traumatic event, the courts have developed a set of criteria, based on proximity and foreseeability and whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty, 141 which limit the extent of the duty. been recognised by the courts, such limits may be arbitrary, but are necessary to limit the scope of the tort and to protect defendants from indeterminate liability.
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In this context, proximity would depend upon the relationship -domestic or geneticbetween the primary party and the third party. So a HCP might owe a duty to warn of an infectious disease to the persons living with the patient, as primary party, but not to visitors to the household or members of the general public. A HCP who negligently discharged a patient who was still infectious might owe a duty of care to that patient's immediate family, but would not be liable for a general outbreak of the disease.
Applying the concept of proximity to the case of genetic conditions, the HCP might owe a duty to first and second order relatives, but not to more distant relations. This requirement would allay any fears of a HCP facing indeterminate liability as a result.
To succeed, the claimant would still have to show that the HCP did not act reasonably.
The existence of a duty of care does not mean that the HCP is liable for any harm caused: he will only be liable to the extent that his failure to act reasonably caused the injury. So a HCP treating a genetic disorder would owe a duty to any relative with the necessary genetic proximity. But to hold the HCP liable for any harm suffered, the relative would also have to show that he acted unreasonably. As the Superior Court of New Jersey held in Safer v Pack, the duty is to ensure 'that reasonable steps be taken to assure that the information reaches those likely to be affected or is made available for their benefit.'
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Depending on the specific circumstances, a HCP might discharge his duty to any relative by appropriate advice to the patient: for example, advising the patient of the risk to relatives and referring him to genetic counselling. If the HCP was aware that the patient was unwilling to pass on the information, then they might be under a duty to pass on the information, with the consequential breach of the patient's confidentiality, to any third parties with sufficient proximity to give rise to a duty of care.
Imposing such duties would not, as was suggested by counsel for the defendant in ABC, 145 place HCPs in a difficult position; or at least no more than their existing professional obligations do.
Drawing together the duty of confidence and the duty to warn
These two duties are the corollary of each other; in practice, questions about whether to disclose information to family members of a proband raise the issue of both the duty of confidence, and duty of care to third parties. But although the facts will be the same, the legal tests are separated, and approached differently depending on whether they are analysed from the point of view of the proband (duty of confidence) or that of the family member (duty to warn). Thus, the HCP at the heart of the matter will be faced with two potentially conflicting duties. It would be problematic if the application of the two legal tests led to conflicting outcomes.
At present, an analysis of the duty of confidence may result in a conclusion that disclosure to third parties is in the public interest. Unless there is at least a limited duty to warn in certain circumstances, as outlined above, a risk averse HCP would be well advised to maintain confidentiality, as there will be no party with standing to sue for breach of duty to warn, but there will be a party with a potential cause of action for breach of confidence. Such a position will, it is submitted, skew practice too far in favour of confidentiality.
If the balance of the law is as argued above, then the outcomes of the application of the tests of duty of confidence and the duty of care will be consistent, as well as congruent with ethical obligations. In determining whether disclosure is either authorised (duty of confidence) or required (duty of care) we suggest that ultimately, the HCP (or court)
will be required to balance the competing rights of the parties, and that the central question that will be key in these cases is that of the harm that will result to the third party concerned.
Although there are conceptual differences between these tests, the relevant factors which will feed into the analysis are likely to be the seriousness of the genetic condition in question, its treatability and the chance that the relative in question might inherit the condition. A HCP will need to consider each factual situation on its merits. The question of the threshold of seriousness and treatability is the subject of significant debate in the genetics community, 146 and HCPs will be able to draw on a body of professional opinion, 147 which will no doubt also serve to inform a court.
Serious, treatable conditions will have greater impetus for disclosure than less serious, or untreatable conditions. For example, a case of sudden cardiac death, with a clear genetic contribution, serious outcome and treatment in the form of medication or implantable defibrillator which allows the harm to be averted provides a good example where the balance is likely to be struck in favour of sharing. 148 Conversely, a condition with unclear genetic inheritance or low penetrance, with variable severity and late onset is likely to be one where the balance is struck in favour of maintaining confidence.
There will, however, be situations where the balancing exercise is more complex. We suggest that the cases most likely to be difficult to resolve will revolve around questions of whether there is legally actionable harm. An example is where there is a serious condition, but where at present there is no known treatment to modify disease course.
Whether the law will recognise the personal utility that a party may attach to the mere possession of information, in the absence of any 'use' in the medical sense is questionable. It must also be balanced against the harm that could result from forcing Additionally, it is unclear whether the law would recognise harm in the loss of chance relating to reproductive autonomy. Prenatal testing, preimplantation genetic diagnosis or prenatal testing are all available to those who are aware they are carrying genetic mutations. However, whether the law would recognise a loss of chance in relation to these opportunities seems doubtful.
Arguments in favour of a more expansive view of harm seem more likely to be successful in the context of the duty of confidence, particularly by reference to a human rights analysis. Therefore, a HCP who chooses to disclose to a third party to avert harm of this nature may avoid liability. However, a third party who wishes to claim against a HCP for breach of a duty of care for failure to disclose will be unlikely to succeed due to the law of negligence's more restricted view of harm. It is our contention that this distinction in recovery reflects an appropriate balance -it provides freedom to a HCP who feels an ethical obligation to disclose, but does not impose liability for failure to disclosure.
Applying the test outlined above in the cases of ABC v St George's and Smith v
Leicester is instructive. We suggest that in neither case would the duty of care we propose be found to be breached. In ABC, had the HCPs wished to breach their duty of confidence, they could have argued that disclosure was in the public interest, although the fact that there is no known treatment for Huntington's disease, and that it is known that relatively few people undertake predictive genetic testing would have made that argument finely balanced. However, in the case of the duty of care, it is submitted that, whilst a duty should be owed, that in this case there would be no breach of the standard of care by maintenance of confidence. This is due primarily to the fact that there is no available treatment for this adult onset condition.
It seems likely that the outcome of Smith would also be unchanged. While it would be for the court to determine whether there was sufficient proximity, in the form of the genetic relationship between the patient and the third party, for there to be a duty, the claimant was the second cousin of the patient in question. This is a 5th order genetic relationship, with only 3% of genetic material shared between the parties. It is likely that the court would find insufficient proximity between the parties for there to be a duty of care.
Conclusion
The ultimate analysis in genetic information sharing cases will in essence relate to the nature of the harm which arises due to the failure to disclose. The concept of harm is likely to be problematic in many cases, as the type of harm arising may not be recognised in law. However, this failure of the law to recognise some types of harm arising in genetic information sharing is appropriate. The ethical judgements in these cases are not clear cut, and reasonable HCPs, and lawyers, may disagree as to the appropriate outcome. In the absence of clear ethical consensus, it seems appropriate that the law should not mandate disclosure. The appropriate outcome is that only in fairly rare cases should there be a duty to disclose, and in a slightly wider series of cases will disclosure be authorised.
As was noted in Montgomery, " [u] nder the stimulus of the Human Rights Act 1998, the courts have become increasingly conscious of the extent to which the common law reflects fundamental values." 150 These fundamental values underpin the medical profession's ethical principles and it is desirable that legal obligation reinforce, rather than conflict with, professional obligations. 151 Most HCPs working in clinical genetics regard informing those who might be directly affected by their patients' genetic information as something that a reasonable HCP should do, and there is a significant body of medical literature examining the circumstances in which disclosure is ethically desirable. 152 In some circumstances, where disclosing the genetic information would allow the relative to receive earlier treatment, they might regard that as outweighing their duty of confidentiality to their patient. A HCP who does disclosure information to a family member in the face of opposition from their patient runs the risk of being liable for breach of confidence. To counterbalance this risk, it is our contention that, in limited circumstances, a duty of care should arise. This would make the law congruent with the GMC Guidance on Confidentiality in relation to disclosure of genetic information to family members, as well as the reported experience of many HCPs working in clinical genetics. It is our contention that this is an additional factor in favour of the rebalancing of the law we propose.
The familial nature of genetic information strains the individualistic approach of the law in relation to confidentiality and tort. However, the law is sufficiently flexible to accommodate scientific and medical realities. The law of confidence permits the disclosure of information in the public interest, and the flexibilities of the way in which public interest is interpreted permit disclosure in limited and appropriate circumstances.
More controversially, we argue that, in certain limited circumstances, a duty of care
should be owed by a HCP to third party family members. We contend that it is more suitable in this case for the limits on liability to arise at the stage of breach, rather than the duty of care imposition.
